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 Introduction
Student aid is widely used as a tool to promote higher
ucation participation among individuals from disadvan-
ged groups. Empirical evidence suggests such policies can
 effective, with studies from the US (Dynarski, 2000, 2003;
cPherson & Schapiro, 1991) ﬁnding increases in partici-
tion in Higher Education (HE) of 3–5 percentage points
r $1000 spending on student grant aid.1 However, there is
evere lack of evidence on the effectiveness of student aid
outside of the US, and none at all for the UK. This is largely
due to the challenging nature of causal inference in such
empirical work. Two particular challenges are present. First,
student aid is generally awarded to those from low-income
backgrounds, rendering aid eligibility correlated with many
other observable and unobservable factors that also affect
an individuals’ HE participation. Second, it is often the case
that policy reforms affecting HE ﬁnance are implemented in
packages, affecting the three main elements of HE ﬁnance
(grants, fees and loans) simultaneously. This is particularly
true in the UK context where the major reforms to date have
included a complex mixture of changes to HE ﬁnance,
making it very difﬁcult to isolate the causal effects of grants
on HE participation.
We overcome these challenges in this paper by
exploiting a policy reform in the UK which affected
students undertaking undergraduate degree courses in
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A B S T R A C T
Understanding how higher education (HE) ﬁnance policy can affect HE decisions is
important for understanding how governments can promote human capital accumulation.
Yet there is a severe lack of evidence on the effectiveness of student aid in encouraging HE
participation outside of the US, and none at all for the UK. This paper exploits a reform that
took place in the UK in 2004, when maintenance grants were introduced for students from
low income families, having been abolished since 1999. This reform occurred in isolation
of any other policy changes, and did not affect students from relatively better off families,
making them a potential control group. We use a difference-in-difference framework to
estimate the effect of the reform on HE undergraduate participation. We ﬁnd a positive
impact of maintenance grants, with a £1000 increase in grants leading to a 3.95 percentage
point increase in participation.
 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–78 67igher education institutions.2 Though the reform affected
arious elements of the HE ﬁnance package, it did so in a
radual manner over time. In particular, it introduced
olicy changes relating to grants two years in advance of
ny other changes (which related to student fees and loans).
his reform to grants affected students from relatively poor
milies only. This reform to maintenance grants was one of
e least publicised components of the 2004 UK Higher
ducation Act, which is mainly associated with the
weeping changes it introduced as and from 2006/2007 –
 particular, the introduction of tuition fees of up to £3000
er year for all students, regardless of background,
eferrable until after graduation using government-sub-
idised loans – quite a change from the previous up-front
es, means-tested at a maximum of £1200 per year.
owever, the Act also included the reintroduction of means-
sted maintenance grants – which had been abolished in
999 – to be phased in from the 2004/2005 academic year.
he level was set at a maximum of £1050 per student for
ose with joint parental incomes of £22,500 or below,3
efore being further increased substantially from 2006/
007 to a maximum of £2700 per year. It is this latter reform
 the re-introduction of grants in 2004/2005 – that provides
e identiﬁcation strategy in this paper.
We use this policy reform to estimate the impact of
tudent aid on degree participation within a difference-in-
ifferences framework. Since relatively better off students
hose with parental incomes above £22,500 pa) were not
ffected by the introduction of grants, they are a valid
ontrol group, subject to caveats discussed later on.
oreover we provide evidence on the plausibility of the
ey common trends assumption across both groups in the
ears preceding the policy shift. Our paper thus presents
are evidence on the effectiveness of student aid in a
uropean setting.
Using data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) on the
rst-year degree participation decisions of young people
om England, Wales and Northern Ireland,4 our differences-
-difference estimates of the impact of the 2004/20055
crease in maintenance grants show that grants have a
ositive and signiﬁcant impact on ﬁrst-year degree partici-
ation. In particular, we ﬁnd evidence that a £1000 increase
 maintenance grants results in a 3.95 percentage point
increase in degree participation. This ﬁnding, which survives
a battery of robustness checks, is in line with results
estimated in a number of similar studies from the US and
Europe (Dynarski, 2003; Hemelt & Marcotte, 2008; Nielsen,
Sorensen, & Taber, 2010). This is not all that surprising;
whilst the UK HEﬁnancesystem issomewhat different tothe
US and Europe, there is relative consistency in how these
countries deliver centralised aid in the form of maintenance
grants. We also ﬁnd similar results from an alternative
estimation strategy using instrumental variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some
background on student aid and the related literature.
Section 3 provides more detail on HE ﬁnance reforms in the
UK over the past two decades. In Section 4 we describe the
data used in the paper. In Section 5 we outline our
methodology. In Section 6 we present the main results of
the paper, the effects of the 2004 increase in maintenance
grants on participation in HE. In Section 7 we present some
robustness tests, including estimates using an instrumen-
tal variables methodology. Section 8 concludes.
2. Student aid: background and literature review
Student aid – also referred to as grants or subsidies – is
widely used as a tool to encourage students from the least
represented groups to enrol in HE, and thus to help
alleviate the relatively tighter credit constraints facing
young people from poor backgrounds compared to their
better-off counterparts, resulting in a more efﬁcient mix of
participants in HE (Carneiro & Heckman, 2002). There may
also be cause to subsidise poorer students for equity
reasons. For instance, if young people from poor back-
grounds are more likely to experience capital market
failures or to lack information, then public subsidies could
be justiﬁed on these grounds. Similarly, those from poorer
backgrounds could be more likely to suffer from debt
aversion, again justifying intervention in the form of non-
repayable subsidies (Goodman & Kaplan, 2003).
Some argue, however, that student aid is unlikely to be
effective; for instance Carneiro and Heckman (2002) argue
that long-term factors are more important in predicting a
youth’s likelihood to go to college than the short-term
liquidity constraints that subsidies are designed to alleviate.
Thus, understanding whether maintenance grants have a
role to play in determining HE decisions is crucial.
Our results are highly relevant to the UK HE system of
ﬁnance going forward. Maintenance grants have continued
to play an important role in the UK HE ﬁnance package.
Despite the increasing share of the ﬁnancial burden borne
by students in the form of tuition fees and loans, UK
government spending on student aid continues to grow –
in 2009/2010, government spend on maintenance grants
was £1050 m – versus the £722 m spend on student fee
loans and £610 m on maintenance loans6 – and reached
2 Throughout we use the term ‘degree’ to speciﬁcally mean undergrad-
ate degree.
3 Students are assessed on joint parental income. If a student’s parents
re divorced or separated then they are assessed on the basis of the
come of the parent they live with most of the time.
4 We exclude Scotland from our analysis. Scotland experienced a
gniﬁcant departure from UK HE policy in 2000 and made a number of
gniﬁcant changes including abolishing tuition fees, lowering student
ans and introducing an endowment of around £2200 per student, to be
aid upon graduation. This renders the Scottish system very different
om the system that covers the rest of the UK. As a student’ treatment
rgely depends on their country of residence rather than country of study
.e. English students studying in Scotland would be ineligible for the
rant and would still be eligible for tuition fees after their abolition in
cotland,) cross border ﬂows of students are not problematic in this sense.
ote that references to the UK in this paper refer to England, Wales and
orthern Ireland – or the UK excluding Scotland.
5
6 All in 2009 prices. Sources: Student grant ﬁgures – Student Loans
Company, Statistical First Release, 06/2009, Table 3. Maintenance loan
and fee loan ﬁgures – DIUS Annual Report 2009, annex 1, Table 11. (This
does not represent the amount of money lent to students, but the futureWe use this notation throughout to denote the academic year
ommencing in September 2004 (for instance).
cost of subsidising and writing off student loans issued in that year as well
as management of the student loans stock).
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–7868nsustainable’ levels.7 Spending on student aid is high
ross Europe, as well as the UK. But little European
idence exists as to whether and to what extent this aid
s an impact on HE participation.
There is a sizeable body of US literature estimating the
usal effects of maintenance grants on HE participation.
narski (2000) ﬁnds that Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship, a
erit-aid programme, had a positive impact on students: a
000 increase in aid resulted in a 4 percentage point
crease in HE participation. A later paper (Dynarski, 2003)
ploits a one-off policy change whereby ﬁnancial aid was
ithdrawn from children with a deceased, disabled or
tired father, ﬁnding that the reform reduces HE
rticipation by 3.6 percentage points. Kane (1995) looks
 the impact of the Pell Grant aid system, ﬁnding no
pact on participation, while Seftor and Turner (2002)
d a small impact of Pell Grant eligibility of 0.7 percentage
ints per $1000 of aid (although on a restricted sample of
ature students). More recently, Nielsen et al. (2010)
ploit a change in aid in the Danish HE system which
rticularly beneﬁtted higher income students, and ﬁnd
at a $1000 increase in grants results in a 1.35 percentage
int increase in HE participation.
These results suggest an important role for mainte-
nce grants in HE participation decisions. However, with
e exception of Nielsen et al. (2010) for Denmark, they all
late to the US context. To the best of our knowledge, our
per is the ﬁrst to examine the role of maintenance grants
 the UK setting.
 Institutional setting
. HE policy reforms in the UK
We focus in this paper on a period of relative stability in
 HE ﬁnance – the period between 1999 and 2005. In this
section we describe policy reforms to Higher Education
leading up to and during this period.
The UK HE ﬁnance system traditionally consists of three
main elements. These are: (a) maintenance grants (intro-
duced in 1962), which are a non-repayable form of support
and are means-tested according to parental income
background; (b) maintenance loans (introduced in
1990), which are repayable as a percentage of earnings
when the graduate is in employment and earning over a
certain threshold (the exact terms and conditions have
varied over time though were unchanged during the period
of our investigation); and (c) tuition fees (introduced in
1998/1999), which have changed in level and nature over
time, being means-tested and up-front from the period
1998/1999–2005/2006, and then deferrable and backed by
a tuition fee loan from 2006/2007 onwards. As is relatively
common in Europe, but in contrast to the US, the UK
system was ﬁrmly rooted in the public sector during our
period of interest.8 Thus, the three elements of HE ﬁnance
were set centrally by the government, and not by Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs).9
Figs. 1 and 2 depict the changes in tuition fees,
maintenance loans and maintenance grants during our
period of interest, while Table 1 sets out the mean values of
grants, fees and loans respectively, for students with
parental backgrounds below £22,500 (hereon referred to
as the ‘treatment group’) and with parental income
backgrounds at or above £22,500 (the ‘control group’).
Shaded areas show the period used in the estimation,
1999–2005.
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Fig. 1. Fee liability and grant and loan eligibility: parental income <£22,500 (treatment group).
8 There was just one private degree awarding institution in operation
during this period, the University of Buckingham. Two further private
institutions (BPP and the New College of Humanities) have since begun
awarding degrees in the UK.
9 From 2006, universities notionally gained control over fee setting
although these were capped at £3000 per annum which was binding for
practically all. The fee cap was lifted to £9000 per year in 2012 introducing
more control over fee setting for universities. This initially resulted inAccording to an independent review of higher education ﬁnance in
 UK, known as the Browne Review (2010, p. 56).
little variation (average fees were around £8600), though variation has
increased as a result of additional incentives for universities to cut fees.
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–78 69The ﬁrst major policy shift occurred in 1998. At this
me, HE participation stood at around 40% (30%) of all 18–
0 (17–20) year olds (HEPI, 2009; Public Accounts
ommittee, 2009). Despite this, however, there was
oncern that the gap in HE participation between rich
nd poor was very wide in comparison with other
eveloped countries (Barr & Crawford, 1998), with
oncerns that it was growing even wider (Blanden, Gregg,
 Machin, 2005).
Thus in 1998, the UK Government introduced up-front
eans-tested tuition fees of £1200 per annum (pa),
ffecting just over half of new undergraduate degree
tudent entrants (students already enrolled were unaf-
cted by this reform – as is the case for all the reforms that
e discuss in this paper) at the time. Such a fee level was
odest in comparison to the US, but relatively high in
omparison to public universities in other countries in
estern Europe such as France and Germany.10 More
elevant for this paper, the reforms also resulted in the
bolition of means-tested maintenance grants from
999 onwards, affecting just over half of all undergraduate
egree entrants – those from poorer backgrounds.
No further reforms to HE ﬁnance policy were put in
lace until the 2004 Higher Education Act. This Act again
rincipally affected prospective undergraduate degree
tudents, and is mainly known for the sweeping changes
 fees it introduced, in the form of tuition fees deferrable
ntil after graduation through the provision of government
ans.11 It also introduced large increases in maintenance
grants of up to £2700 for the poorest students. Crucially,
the increase in grants was phased in two years before any
of the other changes, from 2004/2005 as opposed to 2006/
2007 – and only affected those with parental incomes of
£22,500 or below – as is evident in Fig. 1. This provides
exogenous variation in grants only and thus, we will argue,
a credible source of identiﬁcation for estimating the effects
of non-repayable student support on HE degree participa-
tion. In particular, we exploit the fact that there were no
policy changes to HE ﬁnance between 1999/2000 and
2003/2004, followed by a period of two years that saw the
introduction of maintenance grants for relatively poor
students in isolation of any other policy changes. We
estimate the impact of the reform to maintenance grants
on those affected by it, using those unaffected as a control
group, under the assumption of common pre-reform
trends, which we will discuss in detail later on.
In terms of the level of grants from 2004/2005 (which,
as already discussed, had been scrapped in 1999/2000), the
new grants were means-tested to a maximum of £1050 pa
for students from parental income backgrounds <£15,000
pa and tapered to zero for students with parental income
exceeding £22,500 pa. This was the level of aid that
remained in place in both 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 – and
is illustrated in Fig. 3 below for 2004 (2005 thresholds are
very similar and not shown).12 It is notable from Fig. 3 that
the vast majority of our treatment group have parental
income backgrounds below £15,000 pa with the implica-
tion that the average maintenance grant in our treatment
sample is close to the full amount, at £963 pa.
In 2006/2007, there were considerable changes to the
tuition fee and loans systems, as well as a further increase
in maintenance grants. We thus focus on the period 1999/
2000 through 2005/2006 to identify the effect of mainte-
nance support on degree participation.
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Fig. 2. Fee liability and grant and loan eligibility: parental income £22,500 (control group).
0 Public universities in France and Germany charge low or no fees,
ough private universities can charge signiﬁcantly more (see the
ternational Comparative Higher Education Finance Project, available at
ttp://gse.buffalo.edu/org/inthigheredﬁnance/project_proﬁles.html).
1 Fee loans were available at a zero real interest rate, repayable
ccording to income (at 9% above a threshold of £15,000). Unlike its
redecessor, the fee, which could be up to £3000 per year, was not means-
sted. Maintenance loans remained pretty much unchanged, though
ey were reduced slightly for students who saw a grant increase in 2006/
12 As is apparent from Fig. 1, another suitable method of evaluation for
this policy could be to use a Regression Kink Design (RKD). However, as007. Dearden, Fitzsimons, and Goodman (2004) and Dearden, Fitzsi-
ons, Goodman, and Kaplan (2008) contain more details.
will become clear later on, our sample size precludes the possibility of
gaining robust estimates using RKD.
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–7870As illustrated in Fig. 1, for poorer students, the only
ment changing during the (shaded) period is grants
ote also that the treatment group was not affected by the
troduction of tuition fees in 1998 since only those from
her backgrounds were eligible for the fees). As
ustrated in Fig. 2 meanwhile, there were no policy
anges implemented during this period for relatively
tter off students, the control group.13
. HE age-entry rules
As well as academic attainment requirements,14 in the
, eligibility for the ﬁrst year of HE is determined by date of
rth. This is because in the UK, English schooling laws are
ch that individuals enrol in school in the academic year
arting September) just after turning 4 (so they must be
ed 4 by August 31st to attend in that academic year).
dividuals leave school at age 18 or 19, after 14 years of
hooling.15 Therefore, youths become eligible for HE if they
e aged 18 before August 31st of that academic year. This
eans that young people can be aged either 18 or 19 when
ey ﬁrst become eligible for HE. It is therefore necessary to
ow an individual’s exact birth date in order to know the
ademic year that individuals become eligible for HE, and
us the HE ﬁnance policy they are subject to.
4. Data
The objective of the paper is to estimate the effect of
maintenance grants on the decision to enrol in an
undergraduate degree programme at a higher education
institution. Our sample comprises individuals who are
eligible for the ﬁrst year of HE regardless of prior educational
attainment, or in other words, individuals who are of the
appropriate ‘academic age’ (used hereon) for the ﬁrst year
of HE.16 Our paper is the ﬁrst empirical study to focus on
the effect of HE ﬁnance policies on entry to higher
education rather than on the decision of students to
continue at HE in any particular year.17
We use data from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) over
the period 1993 through 2006. This follows approximately
60,000 households every quarter, with households inter-
viewed for ﬁve consecutive quarters (i.e. waves 1–5, so
wave 1 and wave 5 are one year apart) and then removed
from the panel and replaced with a new household. This
design means that it contains information on individuals
living at home in the year before they are eligible for higher
education (t  1), as well as their higher education
enrolment decision a year later (t). Moreover, it records
individuals’ date of birth and parental income, and has
adequate sample sizes to allow for robust estimation. This
ble 1
ition fees and maintenance grants for undergraduate degree students (£pa).
cademic year Parental income <£22,500: treatment group Parental income £22,500: control group
Loan Grant Fee Loan Grant Fee
1993 1072 3018 0 1072 1252 0
1994 1518 2682 0 1518 966 0
1995 1773 2402 0 1773 854 0
1996 2040 2109 0 2040 659 0
1997 2022 2094 0 2022 636 0
1998 3227 956 0 2838 493 982
999b 4217 0 0 3670 0 1010
2000 4284 0 0 3766 0 1019
2001 4311 0 0 3812 0 969
2002 4335 0 0 3829 0 977
2003 4320 0 0 3814 0 947
2004 4300 963 0 3757 0 985
2005 4321 958 0 3738 0 1010
006a 3130 2661 2889 3490 442 2904
2007 3147 2670 2908 3555 481 2933
2008 3136 2693 2897 3448 1245 2910
A £3000 tuition fee loan was also available from 2006/2007 onwards. Maintenance loan amounts depend on whether the student is attending a London
non-London higher education institution, and whether (s)he is living at home or away from home; the ﬁgures in this table refer to non-home, outside
ndon.
Shaded areas denote the estimation period.
Note that HE ﬁnance policy changes occurring during the duration of
ir course do not affect students – the maintenance grant on entry
ains the same throughout the lifetime of their course.
Entry requirements vary by institution but generally students are
uired to have a minimum of 2–3 A-levels (the academic qualiﬁcation
ered by educational institutions to students completing secondary or
-university education).
In fact, during our period of interest, youths could leave school at age
; though doing so would almost certainly preclude them from entering
16 Having access to exact date of birth allows us to advance on studies
such as Blanden and Machin (2004) where individuals in certain age
ranges are observed over time, without precise knowledge of the speciﬁc
HE policies they are subject to.
17 This is because we are unable to ascertain which HE policy individuals
who have already left school are subject to: for those in university, we do
not observe the year in which they began studying and hence the relevant
HE ﬁnance policy in place at that time; for those not in education, it is
more difﬁcult to observe parental income, as they are less likely to beiversity since academic entry qualiﬁcations (discussed above) are
nerally taken in post-compulsory schooling at age 17–18.
living at home in the previous period and thus we are less likely to
observe their parents.
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–78 71 the only UK data source to combine all of these pieces of
formation, which are necessary for this analysis.
We begin with 31,659 students of academic age,
pread across 1993–2008 (for every available year in the
FS). We drop individuals who either live away from
ome and therefore whose parental income is unob-
erved (4296 individuals), and those who live at home but
hose parental income is missing (3936 individuals).
his is because we are unable to estimate parental
come and therefore maintenance grant, fee or loan
ligibility for this group.18 This leaves us with a ﬁnal
ample of 23,427 individuals (almost three quarters of
he original sample). For each of these individuals, we use
is/her date of birth to map on the HE ﬁnance policy (s)he
 subject to. To calculate exact eligibility for grants and
es, we combine information on their parental income
ith the HE policies in place in that particular year of
ligibility, as described next.
To calculate an individual’s fee liability and grant and
an eligibility, we apply the relevant means-testing
rmulae to parental income.19 Amongst our ﬁnal sample,
r 12% we observe parental income in the year prior to HE
ecision, which is the relevant ﬁgure for means-testing; for
e remainder, parental income is observed the year of the
E decision; however as income is fairly stable across
djacent years,20 we use this to impute lagged income,
djusted for inﬂation. This introduces some random noise
nd makes our estimates less precise, though is unlikely to
ave any substantive effect on the estimates.21
Table 2 shows summary statistics and sample means
r all of the variables used in the analysis. The
ain outcome variable is ‘attending ﬁrst year of HE,
undergraduate degrees only’. The average participation
rate across the sample is 17.6% of individuals of academic
age,22 though this varies considerably by parental income,
and therefore for our treatment and control groups, as we
will see. Other variables of interest in the table include
gender, ethnicity (a binary variable taking the value 1 if
the individual is white and 0 otherwise), a dummy
variable for youth’s age when they ﬁrst became eligible for
higher education (taking the value 1 if the youth became
eligible for higher education within six months of turning
18 (‘younger’), and 0 if they became eligible for higher
education when older than this23), prior educational
attainment (measured as having 5 or more good GCSEs24
or less than 5 good GCSEs), education level of each parent
(measured in four categories of attainment using the
National Qualiﬁcation Framework of both educational and
vocational qualiﬁcations) and main UK region. Note that
region represents the region of home domicile of the
individual.25
Fig. 3. Maintenance grant eligibility by parental income, 2004.
8 Note that this group with missing household income look very similar
 those in our sample, though they are slightly less likely to be white, and
re slightly better educated. We ﬁnd that the group who live away from
ome are also largely similar to those in our chosen sample (although we
ave no information on their parental characteristics) but are more likely
 be female.
9 We observe parental earnings, as opposed to parental income, in the
FS. We therefore use earnings as a proxy for income.
0 For those for whom we observe current and previous year’s income,
e correlation is 0.75.
1 Note that for the years of 1993–1996, parental income was only
22 While overall UK participation is considerably higher than this, our
sample is restricted to the cohort of university eligible school leavers
(made up of some 18 year olds and some 19 year olds), depending on date
of birth. While we cannot ﬁnd a directly comparable ofﬁcial measure of
participation, government statistics (National Statistics, March 2012)
imply that such students constitute less than half of total UK university
participants, with ﬁgures for 2009 showing a participation rate of 22.5% of
all 18 year olds, and 11.1% of all 19 year olds.
23 As described in footnote 2, youths become eligible for school if they
are aged 18 before August 31st of that academic year. This means those
born in summer months enter school, and therefore university, at a
younger age than those born from September 1st onwards. This variable
can be calculated where we have information on the date of birth of the
student (only available in our sample between 1993 and 2005).
24 GCSEs are the set of qualiﬁcations taken by UK pupils at the end of
compulsory schooling aged 15/16 and are thus an important and widely
used measure of ability of the student as well as their previous
performance in school exams. They are standardised across the country
so results of every child are comparable. GCSEs are graded A*–G, and
generally grades A*–C are considered to be the minimum requirement for
employers and educational institutions. Hence, we deﬁne a good GCSE as
one graded A*–C, and our GCSE variable is as equal to 1 if the student has
5 or more GCSEs graded A*–C, and 0 otherwise.
25 So students and non-students living in a region away from home have
their home domicile as their region, rather than the region of the
institution they are attending/place they are working. Note, in thiscorded in wave 5, so it is not possible to observe previous year’s income
r any of those 4 years.
respect, that HE ﬁnance is dependent on country of domicile rather than
on country of institution.
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As discussed already, the policy reform that we use to
timate the effect of maintenance grants on HE degree
rticipation is the phase-in of maintenance grants from
04/2005.
We will use a difference-in-difference framework to
timate the effect of grants on HE degree participation,
fectively comparing changes over time in HE degree
rticipation amongst those affected by the above policy
ange to changes over time in HE degree participation
ongst those unaffected by it. Difference-in-differences
appropriate since we will estimate the impact of a policy
ange which occurred at a particular moment in time
004/2005) and affected a particular group (low income
dents). The presence of a ‘clean’ comparison group (high
come students) that is unaffected by the policy change,
d the fact that both groups were unaffected by any policy
anges in the years leading up to the increase in grants,
akes difference-in-difference the appropriate methodol-
y to analyse the ‘natural experiment’ arising from the
introduction of grants.
The treatment group is individuals of academic age
eﬁned as in Section 3.2) whose parents earn less than
2,500 pa and the control group is those whose parents
rn more than £22,500 pa. One important condition
hich must be satisﬁed is that the treatment and control
oups display common trends before the treatment.
erefore, we will provide visual evidence of common
nds in degree participation across the two groups, and
e will also test this assumption in a regression
mework. We will also provide robustness exercises in
ater section. In the analysis we also control for important
served factors which may impact an individuals’
cision to participate in HE, including gender, ethnicity
for prior educational attainment of the student (GCSE
attainment) as described in Section 4. This is a particularly
important control since several studies (e.g. Chowdry,
Crawford, Dearden, Goodman, & Vignoles, 2013) empha-
sise the important role of prior educational attainment in
higher education participation, especially for the most
disadvantaged students. Finally, we control for education
level of each parent and UK region, variables which were
described in Section 4.
An important aspect of the grant phase-in concerns the
timing of the policy announcement, which was in early
2004,26 just 7 days before the deadline for HE applications
for the 2004/2005 academic year.27 With such a short
period between the announcement and the application
deadline, individuals applying for 2004/2005 would in all
likelihood not have had time to react to the announcement
of the forthcoming grant introduction and to incorporate it
into their application decision. However, those of academic
age for the 2005/2006 academic year would have been
aware of the policy change for a year, making it more likely
to see the grant increase affecting this group of individuals.
For this reason, in the empirical analysis we will separate
out the effects in both years.
We also note that 2005 is the year before the major
2006 reforms were enacted, and thus a concern over
anticipation effects may arise. This is an important issue
and one which we carefully investigate; we come back to it
in Section 5.2 where we provide several pieces of evidence
suggesting that this is unlikely to be an issue.
ble 2
mmary statistics (Labour Force Survey 1993–2008).a
ariable Mean (sd) Variable Mean (sd)
E degree participation 0.18 (0.38) Parental education:
arental income: Father: has no qualiﬁcations 0.13 (0.33)
£22,500: treatment group 0.61 (0.49) NVQ level 4 or above 0.19 (0.39)
£22,500: control group 0.39 (0.49) NVQ level 3 0.10 (0.30)
ender NVQ level 2 0.20 (0.40)
ale 0.54 (0.50) NVQ level 1 0.14 (0.34)
emale 0.46 (0.50) Missing 0.25 (0.43)
thnicity Mother: has no qualiﬁcations 0.23 (0.42)
hite 0.85 (0.36) NVQ level 4 or above 0.20 (0.40)
on-white 0.08 (0.28) NVQ level 3 0.08 (0.27)
issing 0.06 (0.23) NVQ level 2 0.21 (0.41)
ge ﬁrst eligible for HE NVQ level 1 0.22 (0.41)
ounger 0.41 (0.49) Missing 0.06 (0.23)
lder 0.38 (0.49) UK region
issing 0.21 (0.40) England 0.89 (0.32)
rior educational attainment: Northern Ireland 0.06 (0.23)
ess than 5 GCSEs 0.18 (0.38) Wales 0.06 (0.23)
ore than 5 GCSEsb 0.56 (0.50)
issing 0.26 (0.44)
 23,427
Sample shown is all those age-eligible for ﬁrst year of higher education.
This is the expected level of attainment by the end of compulsory education in the UK.
26 To be precise, the announcement was made on January 8th 2004 in
the ﬁrst reading of the Higher Education Bill.
27 See http://www.ucas.com/students/importantdates – the deadline
 the majority of applications is January 15th.d age ﬁrst eligible for higher education. We also control for
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The ﬁrst issue we address concerns the appropriateness
f our control group. As is well-known, the key assumption
r identiﬁcation using difference-in-differences is that
ends in degree participation over time are similar for
eatment and control groups in the period preceding the
eforms (pre-2004/2005 academic year). Whilst this
ssumption cannot be tested, it is useful to compare
ends in degree participation between treatment and
trends do indeed look similar, we assess the validity of the
common trends assumption by testing whether the trend
in the treatment group is statistically different from the
trend in the control group. We estimate the yearly
difference between the treatment and control groups for
each year leading up to the policy change in 2004, shown in
Table 3. We also include a treatment dummy (to pick up
the average difference between treatment and control
groups) and year dummies (2003/2004 omitted), as well as
control variables (as described in Section 4). None of the
treatment effect-year dummies are statistically signiﬁcant
(or jointly signiﬁcant), providing evidence that the
treatment and control groups share common trends in
the years leading up to the policy change and giving us no
reason to believe that they would not have been the same
going forward in the absence of any reforms.
5.2. Anticipation effects and deferral rules
As discussed, we have two years of post-reform data:
2004/2005 and 2005/2006. The latter precedes another set
of reforms, raising the concern that it may reﬂect
behavioural changes in anticipation of the new reforms.
The particular concern here is that students who were
eligible for higher education in 2005/2006 and who would
– in the absence of any reforms – have taken a gap year and
postponed entering their degree programme to 2006/2007
(or later) may have chosen to enrol in their degree
programme in 2005/2006 in order to avoid the fee. If such
students are disproportionately found in the treatment
group, our estimate may be biased upwards.
However, this concern is greatly alleviated by the fact
that in the period we are considering, individuals could
enrol in a degree programme in the year before the fee
increase (2005/2006), and then defer for at least a year
whilst retaining the fees applicable on enrolment.28 This is
made clear by Clark (2010), ‘‘The plan [for the 2012/2013
0
.
1
.
2
.
3
.
4
pr
op
or
tio
n 
pa
rti
cip
at
in
g 
in
 h
ig
he
r e
du
ca
tio
n
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
Academic year
treatment group control group
Fig. 4. Degree participation, pre-treatment period: treatment vs control.
Table 3
Probability of ﬁrst-year degree participation at age
18–19.
Variables
Treatment 0.03
(0.02)
Year = 1999 0.00
(0.02)
Year = 2000 0.01
(0.02)
Year = 2001 0.01
(0.02)
Year = 2002 0.01
(0.02)
Treatment  1999 0.01
(0.03)
Treatment  2000 0.01
(0.03)
Treatment  2001 0.01
(0.02)
Treatment  2002 0.03
(0.02)
Constant 0.03
(0.02)
Observations 7888
R-Squared 0.02
Controls Y
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
28 The ability to defer entry and at the same time avoid a tuition fee
crease has since been abolished.ontrol groups pre-2004/2005. Whilst Fig. 4 shows that the in
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–7874ademic year] contrasts with the arrangements made the
t time fees increased signiﬁcantly – in 2006 – when they
se from £1200-a-year to £3000-a-year. Then, students
plying in 2005 for deferred entry in 2006 were allowed
 pay at the lower rate amid fears of a mass scramble for
aces’’.
So any student who intended to take a gap year could
ll do so and avoid the higher fee, meaning there should
 no ﬁnancial incentive to be had from not taking a gap
ar in 2005/2006 and instead enrolling straight away.
idencing this, 7.5% of accepted applicants chose to defer
try in 2004/2005 – and there was no discernible break in
nd of deferral rates in the years around our estimation
riod – suggesting students did not behave differently
cause of the forthcoming fee.29
 Results
In this section we present estimates of the effect of
aintenance grants on ﬁrst year HE degree participation.
Fig. 5 illustrates HE participation over time, separately for
the treatment and control groups, over the entire period
for which we have data – 1993/2004 through 2008/2009.
As it happens, the treatment (control) group broadly
corresponds to those with parental income backgrounds
below (above) UK median income,30 making our analysis
all the more informative from a policy perspective. As
Fig. 5 shows, degree participation is strongly positively
correlated with parental income (the determinant of
whether an individual is treatment or control). On average
over the entire period of 1993–2008,31 inequality was
high – 13.5% of individuals from the treatment group
participated in HE, compared with 24.8% of individuals
from the control group – and it is also clear that the gap in
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Fig. 5. Degree participation over time, treatment and control groups.
ble 4
gree participation (probability at age 18/19) proportion participating in HE.
1999/2000–2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 Change (2004/2005)a Change (2005/2006)
£22.5k (treatment) 0.149 0.155 0.156 0.007 (0.013) 0.007 (0.012)
£22.5k (control) 0.263 0.270 0.235 0.007 (0.018) 0.028 (0.018)
Treatment-control) 0.114 (0.008)*** 0.115 (0.02)*** 0.079 (0.019)***
ifference-in-difference (2004/2005) 0.001 (0.022)
ifference-in-difference (2005/2006) 0.036 (0.021)*
Grants introduced near HE application deadline in 2004.
ndard errors in parentheses.
p < 0.1.
p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
30 Estimates for weekly median income in 2010/2011 are approximately
£419 per week, which equates to around £20,000 pa in 2006 prices (IFS,
2012).
31 We choose this period since this is the entire sample of LFS data
available at the time of analysis. While we do not go beyond 1995–2005 in
our estimation, we use the entire sample for various robustness checksSee http://www.ucas.com/about_us/stat_services/stats_online/data_
les/deferring.
including analysis of pre-reform trends, and to put the estimation period
into context.
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ut this period.
.1. Difference-in-difference analysis
Table 4 focuses on our period of interest, illustrating HE
articipation by treatment and control groups before and
fter the 2004 grant introduction. Note that, for reasons
xplained in Section 5 regarding students not having had
ufﬁcient opportunity to respond to the early increase in
rants in the academic year 2004/2005, we show results
r 2004/2005 and 2005/2006 separately.
As Table 4 shows, during the four year period between
999/2000 and 2003/2004 – during which there were no
aintenance grants – the gap in HE participation between
e treatment and control groups was 11.4 percentage
oints (column 1).
Looking at 2004/2005, the ﬁrst year of the maintenance
rant introduction, we see no difference in HE participation
mongst individuals in the treatment group compared to
ose in the control group (column 2). However, the
crease in grants was announced just before the HE
pplication deadline corresponding to 2004/2005 (see
ection 5.2), meaning that HE applicants had very little
me to react to it in their decision-making (or indeed may
ot even have been aware of it). In 2005/2006, however,
dividuals in the treatment group are 3.6 percentage
oints more likely to be participating in HE compared to
dividuals in the control group. As the only change to HE
nance during this period relates to the introduction of
rants, which affected the treatment but not the control
roup, we attribute this differential to this reform, and will
robe this ﬁnding further in the analysis that follows.
Whilst Table 4 shows the ‘raw’ difference-in-difference
stimates, we next estimate it in the following regression
amework:
i ¼ a þ bðtreat  2004iÞ þ gðtreat  2005iÞ þ dtreati
þ u2004i þ m2005i þ Xi þ yi (1)
here the dependent variable yi is a binary variable which
kes the value 1 if the youth is enrolled in the ﬁrst year of a
E degree and 0 otherwise. 2004i is a variable equal to 1 if
e youth ﬁrst becomes eligible for HE for 2004/2005
cademic year and 2005i is equal to 1 if the youth is ﬁrst
ligible for HE for the 2005/2006 academic year. Treati is a
ariable set to 1 if the youth’s parental income is less than
22,500 pa, and 0 if the youths’ parental income is equal to
r above £22,500 pa. Xi denotes the characteristics listed in
able 2. We estimate Eq. (1) over the period 1999/2000–
005/2006. Note that since we do not observe take-up of
aintenance grants among the treatment group, but just a
roxy for eligibility, the parameters we estimate are
tention-to-treat ones. The effect of maintenance grants
n ﬁrst year HE participation is given by the coefﬁcients b
nd g which capture the impacts separately in 2004/2005
nd 2005/2006 respectively.
Estimates from Eq. (1) are shown in column 1 of
able 5. The point estimate for 2005/2006 remains very
imilar to the one shown in Table 4, at 3.8 percentage
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given the precision
of our estimates, we cannot reject an effect as small as
0.001. Note also that the fall in HE participation among the
control group in 2005/2006 is no longer statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels.
As the average increase in maintenance grants over the
period we consider was approximately £960 in real terms,
this means that a £1000 increase in grants equates to a
3.95 percentage point increase in HE participation. Though
not directly comparable due to differences in exchange
rates, this estimate is in line with ﬁndings from other
studies – Dynarski (2000, 2003) ﬁnds that a $1000 increase
in student aid results in a 3.6–4 percentage point increase
in participation for students in the US, and Nielsen et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that a $1000 increase in grants results in a
1.35 percentage point increase in HE participation for
students in Denmark.32
7. Robustness
The results so far show that the group of students who
were eligible for a new maintenance grant in 2004/2005
increased their HE participation after the reform by
signiﬁcantly more than those ineligible for the new grant.
In this section we conduct three robustness exercises to
probe this ﬁnding further. The ﬁrst concerns our choice of
control group; the second concerns the deﬁnition of our
treatment group; and the third implements a different
estimation strategy using instrumental variables.
Although we mitigated concerns around our choice of
control group by showing it exhibits very similar pre-
reform trends to the treatment group, in the second
column of Table 5 we estimate the impact of the
maintenance grant on HE participation using an alterna-
tive – narrower – control group, which is closer in terms of
Table 5
Effect of maintenance grants on degree participation at age 18/19.
Independent variables (1) (2) (3)
Treatment  2004 0.011
(0.020)
0.009
(0.021)
0.023
(0.021)
Treatment  2005 0.038**
(0.019)
0.040*
(0.021)
0.036*
(0.020)
Year = 2004 0.006
(0.015)
0.004
(0.017)
0.006
(0.015)
Year = 2005 0.025
(0.016)
0.031*
(0.018)
0.025
(0.016)
Treatment 0.018**
(0.009)
0.008
(0.009)
0.020**
(0.009)
Constant 0.111***
(0.017)
0.109***
(0.019)
0.115***
(0.019)
Observations 11,286 10,082 10,973
R-Squared 0.154 0.163 0.175
Sample includes individuals eligible for ﬁrst year of HE for all of UK except
Scotland.
All models include full set of controls as listed in Table 2.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.32 At the time of writing, $1000 was roughly equivalent to £630.oints, though is more precisely estimated and is
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L. Dearden et al. / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 66–7876rental income to the treatment group: those with annual
rental incomes between £22,500 and £50,000.33 The
cond column of Table 5 shows that the narrower control
oup yields very similar estimates to our main speciﬁca-
n, and yields a treatment effect of 4 percentage points,
hich is very close to our original estimate and is
niﬁcant at the 10% level.
Second, we vary the treatment group, by including in it
st those eligible for the full grant of £1050 pa, and thus
cluding individuals eligible for a partial grant. As the
ter represent just about 10% of those eligible for a grant,
e results are not impacted substantially, as shown in the
ird column of Table 5.
Third, we carry out some falsiﬁcation tests. Our speciﬁc
ncern is that the relative increase in participation in the
atment group relative to the control group is driven by
mething other than the increase in grants, such as simply
ise in the data. Visually examining movements in
rticipation over our period of interest, there is some
dication that in the period around 2001/2002 and 2002/
03, particularly in 2002/2003, participation fell among
r control group but remained stable among our
atment group. As this is the same pattern that drives
r relative increase in participation in 2005/2006 (the
ain result of this paper), we perform a robustness check
 follows. We select as ‘policy on’ period the year 2001/
02, with the years preceding this (1999/2000–2000/
01) as our ‘policy off’ period. The speciﬁcation remains
herwise the same as in Eq. (1), with our parameter of
terest being the interaction between the treatment
group and the year 2002/2001. As a second falsiﬁcation
test we repeat the exercise with our ‘policy on’ period the
year 2002/2003, with the years preceding this (1999/
2000–2001/2002) as our ‘policy off’ period. The results can
be found in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6, where the
treatment effect is found to be insigniﬁcant in both
speciﬁcations.
Finally, we assess robustness of ﬁndings to a different
estimation strategy, instrumental variables. Given that
the level of the grant an individual is entitled to is a (non-
linear) function of parental income, raising endogeneity
concerns with estimating its impacts directly, we instead
use instrumental variables to estimate its effect. We use
as an instrument the average level of the grant by
government ofﬁce region (16 in total) and parental
education level (4 categories) in 1999, chosen as our base
year.34 More speciﬁcally, we construct the instrument as
follows:
1. Create average levels of income for every region/
parental education level combination, as of 1999.
2. Assign all individuals in that region/parental education
grouping, regardless of year, the 1999 value of parental
income, inﬂated to the appropriate year (so for instance,
for 2004, the 1999 income value is inﬂated to 2004).
3. Construct the individuals’ grant entitlement based on
that value of income and on the HE policies in place in
each speciﬁc year, which serves as the instrument for
the actual grant.
Note our reason for choosing a base year, rather than
taking year-speciﬁc averages, is that year-speciﬁc averages
may capture underlying trends in HE degree participation
Table 7
IV regression, dependent variable maintenance grant
eligibility.
Independent variables
First stage
Average granta 0.442***
(0.025)
F-stat 76.79
Second stage
Grant-eligiblea 0.039
(0.027)
Observations 10,804
Sample includes individuals eligible for ﬁrst year of
higher education for all of UK except Scotland.
Model includes full set of controls as listed in Table 2.
a Mean value by parental ed*region, based on parental
income in year 1999.
b Omitted category is mother/father has no education-
al qualiﬁcations.
c Standard errors clustered at group level.
d 1 group contained no information so was dropped
(region NI, parental education level missing, parental
income level missing in 1999).
Standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
ble 6
ect of maintenance grants on degree participation at age 18/19
acebo Tests).
ndependent variables (1) (2)
reatment  2001 0.010
(0.022)
reatment  2002 0.023
(0.021)
ear = 2001 0.014
(0.018)
ear = 2002 0.014
(0.018)
reatment 0.024
(0.015)
0.023*
(0.012)
onstant 0.137*** 0.134***
(0.030) (0.025)
bservations 4447 6195
-Squared 0.191 0.184
mple includes individuals eligible for ﬁrst year of HE for all of UK except
tland.
 models include full set of controls as listed in Table 2.
ndard errors in parentheses.
 p < 0.1.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
34The proportion of our sample over the estimation period 1999–2005
th parental incomes above £50,000 pa is just 12%.
Where two parents have different education levels, we take the
higher of the two.
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estriction. Whilst this is not our preferred speciﬁcation,
s it relies on the identifying assumption that the
teraction of region and parental education does not
irectly affect HE participation, we include it as it is free
om any lingering concerns around anticipation effects
though as discussed in Section 5 these are unlikely to be
n issue).
The ﬁrst stage estimates in Table 7 show that the
strument is a strong predictor of the actual grant an
dividual is entitled to. Table 7 also shows the estimates
om the second stage speciﬁcation. The IV estimate
uggests that a £1000 increase in grants results in a
.9 percentage point increase in degree participation. This
oint estimate is extremely similar to the estimate from
e difference-in-difference model, which is very reassur-
g given the different estimation methods, though is less
recisely estimated in the IV framework.
. Conclusion
Understanding how HE ﬁnance policy can affect higher
ducation participation is important for understanding
ow governments can promote human capital accumula-
on. This paper exploits one element of the 2006 reforms
 HE ﬁnance, in which maintenance grants for poorer
tudents were phased in two years ahead of any other
hanges, in 2004, to estimate the effect of student aid on
egree participation.
The policy change occurred in isolation of any others
nd did not affect relatively better off students, who we
se as a control group to identify the effects within a
ifference-in-difference framework. We ﬁnd evidence
hat maintenance grants positively affect degree partici-
ation, with a £1000 increase per year resulting in an
crease in participation of around 3.95 percentage
oints.
Whilst this is a relatively sizeable effect, it does little to
educe the gap in enrolment between those from poorer
nd richer backgrounds, which stands at 15% and 26%
espectively. The estimates are in line with other
ternational studies of the impact of non-repayable
ubsidies on higher education participation. For instance,
ynarski (2003) ﬁnds a 3.6 percentage point increase in
ollege participation from a $1000 increase in non-
epayable aid. However her baseline enrolment rate is
uch higher, at 63%, reﬂecting the fact that her treatment
roup includes a wider range of income backgrounds of
tudents. Our ﬁndings are also in line with studies by
emelt and Marcotte (2008) and Nielsen et al. (2010) for
enmark.
Whilst we are able to identify a causal impact of
ubsidies on participation, our ﬁnding does not necessarily
ply that students are debt averse or that they suffer from
quidity constraints. As Dynarski (2003) points out, an
crease in subsidy is effectively a reduction in the cost of
oing to university. Thus our paper, similar to the studies
bove, is unable to disentangle the subsidy versus liquidity
ffects.
Since we study the impact of grants on participation of
current UK system of grants (as well as that in other
countries such as the US and Europe) continues to operate
in the same manner as during the time of our study.
Indeed, the system of centralised, means-tested mainte-
nance grants continues to be an important element of
the UK HE ﬁnance strategy with £1050 m committed
towards such grants in 2009. This is particularly pertinent
given the changes in the structure of HE ﬁnance over
the last few years in the UK. Severe cuts to university
funding have been carried out, with many courses no
longer receiving government subsidies for teaching. At
the same time, students are now expected to make very
large contributions to their education through tuition
fees which, at £9000 per year, have risen to some of
the highest in the world. Because of these dramatic
increases in costs, the UK government has emphasised
their clear commitment to maintaining non-repayable
subsidies for poor students, with the 2014 maximum
student grant rising to approximately £3400 per year.
These results underlie the importance of government
commitment to non-repayable forms of upfront support
such as maintenance grants for undergraduate degree
participation.
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